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Abstract: Traditionally the study of computer ethics involves taking students who are not philo- 
sophically trained, exposing them to action-guiding theories, presenting them with the codes of 
ethics of several companies and professional organizations and asking them to make ethical deci- 
sions in scenario-based cases. This approach is deliberately action-based and focuses on doing. 
"What would you do?" is the traditional question we ask our students. While this pedagogical 
methodology forces them to examine situations and argue from a particular point of view, it does 
little to influence their character. They see the utilitarian or deontologist as someone other than 
themselves. There seems to be very little internalization of these action-based theories. 
Virtue Ethics offers character-forming theory that has been more successful with my students 
than the action-based theories of computer ethics texts. Why? Virtue Ethics is directed toward 
character development. The focus is on being rather than doing. It presents a good heuristic or 
approach to the problem of moral agency. Virtue ethics offers a way of teaching self-reflection 
through narratives that focus on core values, heroes and moral exemplars. It is grounded in practical 
wisdom. It is experiential, earning to care about the self, others, the community, living the good 
life, flourishing and striving for moral excellence. It offers a model for the development of character 
and personal ethics which will lead to professional ethics. Yet, the strict Virtue Ethics espoused by 
Aristotle has its limitations. This paper will explore the need for a more integrative approach to 
contemporary moral theory, one that may be found by revisiting the virtues through the works of 
Aristotle and Kant. It will offer insight into translating theory into practice for students of computer 
science and information technology. 
Keywords: Virtues, Aristotle, Kant, Core Values, Computer Ethics 
Introduction: ethics and morality 
estern society is confronted with moral and ethical 
roblems on a daily basis. 1 Tabloids, soap operas, and 
scandals scream about breaches of ethics, lying, immoral 
behavior, etc. that bounce 'serious news' off the front page. 
Information technology offers many opportunities for 
breaches of morality. As users of computer technology, we 
are faced with a myriad of ethical problems generated by 
computer-mediated action. Invasions of privacy, using the 
Internet for pornography and illegal access to information 
and systems have become as newsworthy as the sex scandals 
and more far-reaching. The response to these issues, at least 
in the United States has been to try and pass laws to stop the 
abuse. As we have seen, these attempts at regulation are 
seriously disputed by those who value the freedom associ- 
ated with the global information infrastructure and hacked 
around by those with technological expertise. 
As a professor of computer science and information tech- 
nology, I believe that it is my responsibility to sensitize my 
students, the future computer professionals and current us- 
ers of technology, to the moral seriousness of these ethical 
issues. It is my contention, after working with computer 
ethics students for over four years, that there is a certain 
level of amorality that needs to be addressed. Although ac- 
tion-guiding theory has predominated computer ethics texts, 
I believe that my students have found more meaning in char- 
acter-forming theories such as virtue ethics. 
This paper will argue that solving discrete ethical prob- 
lems as a deontologist or consequentialist i  not enough. If 
we are ever hopeful of tackling the serious macro-ethical 
issues generated by computer technology on a more than 
theoretical level, we need to examine how to handle the mi- 
cro-based or individual problems of moral agency. All the 
policies developed will be meaningless unless they impact a 
group of individuals who are sensitive to ethical issues. As a 
practitioner of computer ethics, I would like to suggest hat 
the philosophers who are seeking to define the philosophical 
basis for this field might consider a more integrative ap- 
proach that revisits the virtues. This would benefit those of 
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us who are attempting to educate students to behave as moral 
agents in their personal and by extension professional lives 
by providing character-forming ethical theories on which to 
structure our courses. 
Character-forming vs. Action- guiding theories 
I would argue that character-forming theories are more fun- 
damental than action-guiding theories to the study of com- 
puter ethics. Attempting to teach students computer ethics 
by telling them what to do in discrete situations based on 
what a consequentialist would do, does not impact on their 
character. And, "knowing what to do in any serious sense 
requires good character; for the agent must have developed 
certain abilities of judgment and perception over time, and 
the exercise of these abilities is precisely what we mean by 
good character". 2 The focus should be on hew to develop 
'practical wisdom' and flourish rather than what to do in an 
isolated situation. 
Traditionally computer ethics texts and courses involve 
taking students who are not philosophically trained, expos- 
ing them to action-guiding theories, presenting them with 
the codes of ethics of several companies and professional 
organizations and asking them to make ethical decisions in 
scenario-based cases. This approach is deliberately action- 
based and focuses on doing. "What would a utilitarian do? A 
deontologist? What would you do?" are the traditional ques- 
tions we ask our students. While this approach elps them 
examine situations that may arise in the profession and teaches 
them to argue from a particular point of view, it does little to 
change their individual character. They see the utilitarian or 
deontologist as someone other than themselves and there 
seems to be very little internalization of these action-based 
theories. 
Virtue ethics offers character-forming theory that has been 
more successful with my students than the action-guiding 
theories of computer ethics texts. Why? Virtue ethics is di- 
rected toward character development. The focus is on being 
rather than doing. It presents a good heuristic or approach 
to the problem of moral agency. What does virtue ethics 
offer? Virtue ethics offers a way of teaching self-reflection 
through narratives that focus on heroes and moral exem- 
plars. It is grounded in practical wisdom. It is experiential, 
learning to care about the self, others, the community, living 
the good life, flourishing and striving for moral excellence. It
offers a model for the development of character and per- 
sonal ethics that will lead to professional ethics. 
Need for contemporary moral theory: A more integrative 
approach 
One problem for novices in the field of ethics, (I would 
include most computer science professors in this category), 
is the reductionist view of ethics presented by our current 
texts. Each theory is presented as discrete, apart from any 
others. Practically speaking, a page on Kant or Aristotle does 
not give one much with which to work. Some professors 
argue, therefore, that foundations of ethics should be left to 
the ethicists and kept out of computer science courses. Until 
we are ready, however, to equire philosophical ethics courses 
of our students, most professors are caught in the quandary 
of how to best teach computer ethics given their training 
and background. I do not want to turn this into a debate on 
who should teach computer ethics, which has already been 
done by Deborah Johnson. Ideally, a team approach of an 
ethicist and computer scientist would be 'the best of all pos- 
sible worlds'. But until universities are willing to support 
this, I am trying to find a realistic answer to a very difficult 
problem of how to shake students who are used to dealing in 
binary decisions out of their complacency about ethical is- 
sues by professors who are more used to being technical 
wizards than moral mentors. 
It is unrealistic to discuss computer ethics without merg- 
ing the languages of technology, philosophy, psychology and 
sociology. So it is limiting to read texts hat only peripherally 
touch on these subjects in relation to moral agency. Attempts 
to define the moral theory underlying computer ethics seem 
to take the narrow perspective of trying to fit it into an exist- 
ing philosophical niche instead of trying a broader and more 
integrative approach. This is particularly troublesome be- 
cause computer ethics is by nature an interdisciplinary field. 
Until recently, Aristotle and virtue ethics were not even men- 
tioned in computer ethics texts although is work provides 
insight into moral agency and practical wisdom, both appli- 
cable to the field. Yet, I do not want to dismiss virtue ethics 
merely because certain critics view it as limited to the Greek 
polls. The concept hat we live a certain way and that our 
actions grow out of the vision of who we are is too impor- 
tant to jettison. Personal intentions and dispositions guide 
actions, and people who care about morality think of others 
as well as themselves. Morality is knowing how to live and 
act well. It depends on the humanity within oneself. Doing 
the right thing is not about an action divorced from the self. 
It is an action that flows from the self; it is internally rather 
than externally imposed. Thus, there seems to be a justifi- 
able reason to hold onto the concepts of Aristotle. Yet, it 
would broaden the scope of ethical theory to reassess the 
place of Kant in discussing the virtues. This would give us a 
basis for a richer sense of morality (Louden, 1992) and per- 
haps, a more meaningful base on which to build contempo- 
rary moral theory. 
Revisiting the Virtues: Broadening the Scope 
While ethicists uch as Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Tay- 
lor have re-introduced the language of the virtues into recent. 
ethical theory, very few philosophers have looked to virtue 
ethics as a realistic approach to computer ethics. That is 
because they take what I believe to be a 'strict construction- 
ist' view of virtue ethics restricted to and limited by the 
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mores of the Greek polls. Robert Louden in Morality and 
Moral Theory and Nancy Sherman in Making a Necessity of 
Virtue: Aristotle and Kant on Virtue make the case for the 
reassessment of the role of virtue in contemporary ethics. 
Both Sherman and Louden have taken the next step in revis- 
iting the concept of virtue from the perspective of Aristotle 
and Kant. Although Aristotle is known as the proponent of 
what has come to be known as Virtue Ethics, there is evi- 
dence that Kant preserves the idea of virtue in his moral 
theory as well. Sherman writes, "For it has not been ad- 
equately appreciated that Kant develops a complex anthro- 
pology of morals- a tailoring of morality to the contingent 
features of the human case-which at times brings him into 
surprising alliance with Aristotle and his project of limning 
an account of human excellence". 3 
Louden states, "Much contemporary argument in ethics 
depends on over-simplified pictures of Aritstotle and (par- 
ticularly) Kant. Such argumentation posits exhaustive alter- 
natives that fit neither Aristotle nor Kant but only lesser think- 
ers. An available richness is therefore missing from current 
moral argument, and part of my aim is to recover it". 4 Both 
authors offer insight and a new way of approaching ethical 
theory that made sense to me as a professor of computer 
ethics and has led me to revisit virtue ethics from a broader 
perspective than the traditional agent vs. act debate. Louden 
attempts to recover a richness lacking in current moral argu- 
ment that "recognizes both the irreducible plurality of moral 
values and the reality of irresolvable moral conflict and one 
whose interest in moral deliberation is not distorted by an 
extremist faith in a universal decision procedure (Louden, 
'1992). Sherman elucidates the need for discussions of par- 
ticulars, principles and emotions in dialogues on moral agency. 
In their arguments and explanations, the authors demon- 
strate that when discussing the virtues, there is a place for 
Kant as well as Aristotle. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper and its author to 
develop a detailed integration of the ideas of Kant and Aristotle 
around the virtues, but I will attempt a brief summary of the 
views of Louden and Sherman. What Louden is attempting 
to do is to move ethics away from a single theoretical model 
and incorporate a variety of irreducibly plural types of moral 
value into its basic structure (Louden,1992). He believes 
that both Aristotle and Kant in their respective theories ought 
to describe how people actually think about moral issues and 
then use the results of the analysis for normative purposes. 
"In my view, the best approach to normative moral justifica- 
tion is via just this sort of descriptive account of moral agent's 
actual moral view ,,.5 Sherman seeks to examine ach theorist's 
account of the role of practical reason and moral perception 
within virtue. While both authors acknowledge the differ- 
ences in approach to moral theory by Aristotle and Kant, 
they do not see them as irreconcilable and try to bring the 
two philosophers into dialogue in a way that avoids oversim- 
plification and caricature (Sherman, 1997). 
Both authors answer the criticism commonly associated 
with the theories of Kant and Aristotle. In citing from Kant's 
The Doctrine of Virtue, Louden seeks to justify why one needs 
to examine both the grounding and applying aspects of Kant's 
ethics giving each its due. Both are necessary when trying to 
apply moral theory to human life. Louden writes, 
To summarize Kant's position.., nowhere does he assert that 
human beings can simply deduce correct moral judgments from 
universal, timeless principles. "Empirical or 'anthropological' 
knowledge is always needed when we apply moral theory to 
human life; ... Kant acknowledges r peatedly that principles 
and rules are never self-deploying and that non-rule driven judg- 
ment is needed inethics whenever we deliberate about specific 
cases. Moral principles, inhis view, cannot simply tell us what 
to do. 6 
Sherman reinforces this idea in her discussions on "The 
Cultivation of Emotions as Supports for Duty and Moral 
Anthropology". 7 On the Aristotelian side, Louden and 
Sherman address the issue that the virtues represent "little 
more than a conventional list reflective of the social climate 
of his times". Both defend his virtues as being meaningful in 
the realm of human nature and experience. While Aristotle 
is not known for focusing on principles, Louden feels that it 
is worth exploring the connection of the virtues with prin- 
ciples. Although Aristotle's analysis of higher-order consid- 
erations and principles are not as detailed as Kant's, he does 
attempt to understand moral virtues in terms of what reason 
prescribes, of how one ought to think and feel, of what no- 
bility requires and of what is just at the end of Book II of 
Nicomachean Ethics (Louden, 1992). 
Both Aristotle and Kant share a fundamental interest in 
the question of what basic constraints reason sets on the 
moral life of human beings. Neither asserts that human be- 
ings can simply deduce correct moral judgments from uni- 
versal principles. Both recognize the obvious necessity of 
informed empirical knowledge in human practical reason- 
ing. Each is concerned with the issue of what limits general 
rational considerations place on morality. However, in nei- 
ther case does this latter interest ake the form of issuing 
step-by-step rules that tell people what to do (Louden,1992). 
While Kant's moral theory is generally regarded as ac- 
tion-guiding and Aristotle's as character-forming, does that 
mean that Kant shows no interest in moral education and 
character development or that Aristotle does not focus on 
action? It seems obvious that in choosing to publish two 
works: Education and The Doctrine of Virtue, that Kant must 
have been concerned with both. In acquiring excellence of 
character according to Aristotle, we have knowledge, choose 
the act, choose it for its own sake, and the action must pro- 
ceed from a fixed character. The virtuous person takes plea- 
sure in this activity. He/she is one of action, not simply one 
who theorizes about virtue. The language is about action. 
Sherman and Louden conclude that there are both descrip- 
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tive and normative aspects in the theories of Kant and Aristotle 
although they differ by degrees. Neither of them sought to 
guide moral practice 'from a position above or outside 
it'...Their goal is not to govern practice from above but 
rather to influence it from within". 8 
Louden investigates whether Kant and Aristotle seek to 
produce a moral decision procedure. In the Critique of Pure 
Reason Kant asserts that carrying out rules is a sole concern 
of ethics. Louden feels that reading this assertion as a strict 
rule interpretation flies in the face of Kant's core thesis con- 
cerning autonomy and the need to think for 
oneself.(Louden, 1992). Does adhering to the categorical 
imperative contradict acting autonomously? Louden claims, 
"But while autonomous agents who test their maxims by the 
categorical imperative are 'following a rule,' they are not ap- 
plying a moral decision procedure that can issue a definitive 
solution to any specific moral problem. For insightful appli- 
cation of the categorical imperative always requires a judg- 
ment at a variety of levels". 9 Sherman concurs that for Kant 
the Categorical Imperative is a procedure for deliberationJ ° 
While Aristotle negates that universal rules and principles 
can serve as arbiters of ethical correctness, he states in 
Nicomachean Ethics that 
It is difficult o get from youth up a right training for virtue if 
one has not been brought up under ight laws; for to live tem- 
perately and hardily is not pleasant to most people especially 
when they are young. For this reason their nurture and occupa- 
tion should be fixed by law;...since they must, even when they 
are grown up, practice and be habituated to them, we shall need 
laws for this as well, and generally speaking to cover the whole 
of life; for most people obey necessity rather th n argument. H 
Yet, although Aristotle recognizes a need for laws in the 
public domain, he doesn't subscribe to them as a part of the 
ethical domain. Sherman points out that for Aristotle, "To 
have practical wisdom is just to have virtue internalized in a 
non-codified way. However helpful moral rules of thumb, 
Aristotle doesn't hink of them as expandable into explicitly 
statable rules... ''~2 He relies on experience and interpreta- 
tion. So, although both Kant and Aristotle stress the impor- 
tance in practical deliberation, either subscribes to a moral 
decision procedure that rules out the need for judgment and 
interpretation. 
By following the spirit of Aristotle and Kant, moral theo- 
rists, in demonstrating concern for the particulars and the 
principles, can help people place their specific moral con- 
cerns within a larger(and more rationally justifiable) context 
by 1) generalizing different ypes of relevant moral conflicts 
for which historical records exist; 2)indicating, in encapsu- 
lated form, how such conflicts are addressed previously, by 
both the wise and the ignorant; 3) advocating better alterna- 
tives that might otherwise be overlooked; and 4) rendering 
judgments more consistent. 13I agree that there is a need to 
advocate pluralistic models that integrate, in a non-reduc- 
tionist way, strong notions of virtue and act. Ethics, espe- 
cially computer ethics is non-trivial and certainly non-sim- 
plistic and we should use everything we can to make it mean- 
ingful. To quote Bernard Williams, 
If there is such a thing as the truth about he subject matter of 
ethics,...why is there any expectation that itshould be simple? 
In particular, why should it be conceptually simple, using only 
one or two ethical concepts, such as duty or good state of affairs, 
rather than many? Perhaps weneed as many concepts to de- 
scribe it as we find we need, and no fewerJ 4 
Perhaps we need to heed this advice in thinking about 
computer ethics. 
Core Values 
What are we trying to impart to students? One issue is that 
power necessitates responsibility and accountability. As James 
Moor states in "Reason, Relativity and Responsibility in 
Computer Ethics", ethical responsibility begins by taking 
the ethical point of view. We must respect others and their 
core values. If we can avoid policies that result in significant 
harm to others that would be a good beginning toward re- 
sponsible thical behavior. ~5 We find the basis of these core 
values in the language of the virtues. 
In order to encompass the global nature of the world of 
ICT, we should try to teach values that cross cultures. Before 
asking our students to examine the complex and ovel issues 
of computer technology, we must first ask them to examine 
themselves as human beings with values that motivate them 
to live their lives in a particular manner. Both Louden and 
Moor agree that there are a set of core values that are shared 
by most humans. Moor cites life and happiness for humans 
and includes other core values uch as ability, freedom, knowl- 
edge, resources and security. "These values", he says, "are 
articulated in different ways in different cultures but all cul- 
tures place importance on these values to some extent". ~6 
These core values give us a w y to evaluate the rationality of
our actions and policies. They give us reasons to favor some 
courses of action over others. They provide a framework of 
values for judging the activities of others as well (Moor,1998). 
Basically, they give us a common ground for evaluation and 
understanding. This is particularly evident in the multicultural 
classroom where students are excited to find a mutually com- 
mon ground amidst their different politics, cultural mores 
and religious traditions. 
Louden encourages us in a similar direction in his dis- 
cussion of moral exemplars. He believes that when we look 
at moral exemplars, there is no single scale of measurement. 
Each is maximizing a value be it courage or selflessness or 
integrity in his or her own way and situation. For Louden, 
this is not a problem. He asks, "Why not say that moral 
exemplars are simply those who successfully maximize a cer- 
tain specified mix and amount of irreducible values". 17 He 
further asserts that "It does seem to be the case that there 
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exists a family of core virtues that exemplars exhibit to a 
strong degree--justice beneficence and honesty - but they 
are not all stamped out of the same mold. We recognize that 
morally excellent individuals are those that are disposed to 
stand fast by their chosen principles and ideals". TM While 
Moor suggests that this concept of core values offers a frame- 
work for analysis of policies in computer ethics, I would also 
like to assert that it offers the computer ethics professor a
means of examining human behavior and illustrating examples 
of living well, respect for others and flourishing in the true 
Aristotelian sense of the word. 
The study of moral exemplars who are not the "goody- 
two-shoes" or saints whose behavior is super human offers 
students insights into how ordinary people (although they 
are extraordinary in terms of their ethics) manifest and maxi- 
mize a set of core values that results in respect for others and 
in caring for society as a whole. These exemplars can come 
from both western and non-western cultures and should be 
chosen by the students. They can range from the righteous 
Christians of the Holocaust o the freedom fighters in a spe- 
cific country; from the students in China during the upris- 
ing who delivered the news to the world, to the students who 
spend their time in soup kitchens and building houses for 
the poor; from Aaron Feuerstein who kept his business, that 
had been all but destroyed by fire, open and supported his 
workers with salary and health insurance while rebuilding, 
to the software tester who protests the early release of un- 
tested critical software. This is a lesson of primary impor- 
tance if our students are to be the developers and testers of 
software, creators of new technology and policy makers of 
the future. In asking students to identify their heroes and 
then examining the traits of these people, the professor and 
class can develop a profile of the characteristics of a hero. 
Keeping weekly journals for a month which detail any ethi- 
cal or moral issue the student encounters including acts of 
moral exemplars, raises the level of moral consciousness in 
the student and provides a base for further discussion and 
expansion into moral theory. 
Therefore as a computer scientist who teaches at a univer- 
sity, I am intimately involved with both the technical educa- 
tion and the moral education of students around the use of 
computer technology. 
The role of moral mentor is a daunting concept o those 
of us whose expertise lies on the cutting edge of technology. 
Do we have the practical wisdom to be our students' guide? 
Aristotle believes that morality cannot be taught but needs to 
be practiced, and Kant says that judgment cannot be in- 
structed; it can only be exercised. It is my contention that 
the computer ethics classroom affords the safe-haven for the 
exploration of self-knowledge in relation to the serious moral 
problems associated with computer technology. These prob- 
lems are faced by us everyday at the university: Students 
have had their projects erased from a shared network drive 
by other students; computer software is available in the labo- 
ratories for anyone to copy; students have been flamed or 
defamed on email sent globally; exposed to pornography; the 
system has been compromised by a hacker and files are de- 
stroyed or lost; students ubmit plagiarized work; papers and
programs are copied from web sites; students are addicted 
to role playing in MUD's just to name a few. Character- 
forming theories that focus on the role of moral agency chal- 
lenge students to become more self-aware and reflective so 
that they can appreciate the seriousness of these problems 
and refrain from engaging in such acts. Students begin to 
realize that living ethically is not about rules and formulas. 
People are rational moral agents who have to interpret rules 
according to their own experiences. For Aristotle, if we are 
ever to achieve eudaimonia, we must learn to live our lives 
welt and train our souls through our actions. The study of 
obituaries is an effective xercise to raise the awareness of 
students about what we mean by 'living well or leading the 
good life'. Students are able to draw the correlation between 
the character of the person as manifested in the adjectives 
that describe his/her roles, e.g., loving mother, generous 
friend, admired colleague and the support and care this per- 
son offered to his/her community. 
The practitioner from within 
Ideally, I believe that when the first computer goes into the 
primary school, students hould be taught acceptable on-line 
behavior just as they are taught o be techno-experts. If this 
practice were carried outthroughout the early years of school, 
I am convinced that we would have fewer problems on-line. 
When these students arrive at the university, they would al- 
ready be habituated to what constitutes virtuous on-line be- 
havior and prepared for some serious ethical discussions 
involving the macro or policy issues of computer ethics. At 
this point they could approach, with more insight and so- 
phistication, the complex ethical issues such as privacy us- 
ing philosophical theories to support heir positions. Unfor- 
tunately, the students today have not had this experience. 
Identity 
The concept of identity, especially how it has been influ- 
enced and changed by computer-mediated action is the sub- 
ject for my next paper. Let me just indicate that traditional 
university students are trying to cope with three visions of 
the self: the perceived self, who a person thinks he/she is; 
the real self, who he/she is at this time; and the ideal self, 
who he/she wants to become) 9 The challenge of the profes- 
sor is to make the real self aware of core values and ethical 
issues so that it knows when it is appropriate to use a per- 
ceived or virtual self and how to use its imagination to envi- 
sion the flourishing of the ideal self in the future. 
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Imagination and narrative genre 
One problem of teaching computer ethics is that often, when 
discussing new technology, the impact or consequences of
that technology are unknown. This limits the value of the 
consequentialist model. For example, once an email mes- 
sage is sent the sender has no control over what will happen 
to it. Will it be globally forwarded to others? Will that cause 
repercussions? It is unknown. One has to trust the recipient 
of the message if the data is sensitive. A colleague reported 
that in her hospital an email was received that said, "You are 
sending confidential medical data to this email address and 
the address is incorrect". Luckily this recipient was morally 
responsible. Thus the focus on moral agency and manifesta- 
tion of core values when using technology is imperative to 
the teaching of computer ethics. I have already explained the 
value of studying heroes and moral exemplars. Another valu- 
able asset in the classroom is using stories. Narrative offers 
insight into character behavior not simply actions in a par- 
ticular scenario. Actions grow out of and are motivated by 
the behavior of the character. Readers of stories and novels 
are concerned with the "being" of the character, not simply 
what he/she is doing. 2° Using stories to illustrate behavior is 
not a particularly new technique; biblical stories have always 
been used in religious schools. Sherman maintains that de- 
scription and narrative of the particular case at hand are at 
the heart of moral judgment for Aristotle. 2~ What is the place 
of this narrative in the computer ethics classroom? 
While there are few stories that have been written spe- 
cifically about computer technology, science fiction has al- 
ways explored the interaction of technology and human val- 
ues. In reading the works of Arthur Clarke, for example, we 
discover that what was considered fiction in the 40's and 
50's is reality today. John Artz in "The Role of Stories In 
Computer Ethics" writes, "Consider imagination as the cre- 
ative capacity to think of possibilities. Imagination lets us 
see the world, not as it is, but as it could be". 22 From R UR to 
StarTrek, we are confronted with issues surrounding artifi- 
cial intelligence and robots. This leads to moral consider- 
ations of freedom and slavery. Is Data just a machine who 
can be dismantled at will, asks Captain Picard in Star Trek : 
The Next Generation? Or, because he is self-aware, does he 
have the right to choose whether to be part of an experiment 
that will dismantle him.(Edgar, 1997). We can study the im- 
plications of Asimov's Rules for Robots, Brave New World, 
1984, and Jurassic Parle. The Case of the Killer Robot also 
investigates thical issues specifically pertaining to the area 
of computer technology. Through characters, tudents are 
offered a chance to experience things that they may never 
experience. The broad appeal of this notion has led to the 
popularity of virtual reality. What stories can do in enter- 
taining us is to reinforce traditional values and challenge 
others. Seeing the world as it could be allows us to make 
choices about how it should be.(Artz,1998). 
Louden defines imagination as "our ability to form mean- 
ingful mental images or concepts that are not directly de- 
rived from either sensation or standing propositions in any 
rule-governed manner. Imagination is the ability to think in 
novel ways (Louden 1992). Moral imagination helps us envi- 
sion the type of technology and society in which we would 
like to live. It also helps in moral deliberation by aiding us in 
the interpretation of underlying metaphors. Therefore nar- 
rative genres can be useful in the computer ethics classroom 
to raise awareness of moral behavior. I would agree with 
Louden, however, that moral theory and argumentation 
should be used by students to justify their moral positions 
which could be based on the insights that they have found in 
literature. Having students write a story that presents their 
view on ethical issues and ICT to a group of aliens is an 
interesting exercise that integrates imagination and moral 
theory. 
Conclusion 
This paper has tried to add to the dialogue between the two 
groups concerned with computer ethics: the philosophical 
theorists, those concerned with moral theory and ethical is- 
sues and the philosophical engineers, the practitioners from 
within who work with these problems daily and attempt o 
educate the computer scientists of the future. As a member 
of the latter group who is attempting to incorporate the theo- 
ries of the former into her teaching, I challenge philosophers 
and moral theorists concerned with computer ethics to ap- 
proach the issues of computer ethics as more than just(albeit 
how serious) an intellectual exercise. The answer to our mutual 
concerns lies in open discourse between our groups: those 
from without and the practitioners from within. The reality 
of computer technology is that sooner or later we will all 
become practitioners from within on many different levels. 
We, therefore, need a commonality of language that will cross 
the global infrastructure of Information and Communica- 
tion Technology. I encourage all of us to appreciate that ap- 
proaching computer ethics through moral agency does not 
negate serious attention to action nor concern for objects in 
the information infrastructure. Rather it adds one more di- 
mension to a complex field and approaches computer ethics 
as the integrative, global field that it is. • 
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Notes 
For the purposes of this paper, I will use morality and ethics as synonyms based on 
their etymology. Robert Louden in Morality and Moral Theory indicates that 
morality and ethics have the same roots, mores which means manner or customs 
from the Latin and ethos which means custom and habits from the Greek(Louden 
,167) He refutes the argument of Bernard Williams who sees morality as a subset 
of ethics that emphasizes duty and obligation by referencing Williams' early book 
called Morality: An Introduction to Ethics. I concur with Louden, that in daily 
speech ethics and morality are often used synonymously. 
2 R. Louden, (1992).,Morality and moral theo~y.,Oxford an  New York: Oxford 
University Press, p. 136. 
3 N.Sherman, (1997). Making a necessity ofvirtue: Aristotle and Kant on virtue. 
Canabridge: Cambridge University Press., p. 1. 
4 Louden, p. 7. 
5 Louden, p.136. 
6 Louden, p. 103. 
7 Sherman, p. 292. 
Louden, p. 120. 
9 Louden, p. 114. 
to See Sherman's discussion on "Some Roles for the Categorical Imperative", p. 289 - 
294. 
t, Aristotle, (1969)., The nicomachean ethics of Aristotle. Translated by Sir David Ross. 
London: Oxford University Press,lI, 79b27 
*2Sherman, p. 275. 
~3 Louden, p. 128. 
~4B. Williams,(1985). Ethics and the limits of philosophy. Cambridge, MA. Harvard 
University Press, p. 17. 
)5 j.H. Mool;,(1998). Reason, relativity, and responsibility in computer thics. Co mputers 
and Society 28,1. March, 1998, p. 21. 
)6 Moor, p. 20. 
17 Louden, p.49. 
18 Loouden, p. 51. 
19 These terms were presented in a report o the Student Development Plan Meeting at 
Sacred Heart University in May,1997 by Professor Ed Malin. Thanks to Jen 
McGovern for bringing this report o my attention. 
20 Sherman provides an interesting discussion of narrative in her chapter on "Practical 
Wisdom in Kantian Ethics. P. 318. 
21 Sherman, p. 244. 
22 Artz, p. 12. 
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